It is hard to pinpoint the moment when Brexit enthusiasts stopped claiming that leaving the EU could be painless. The promises of an easy, lucrative separation faded gradually after the referendum campaign. Now even zealous Eurosceptics preface their rosy visions of a post-EU future with caveats of temporary disruption.
Meanwhile, the Treasury has taken a consistently gloomy view, seeing no model of Brexit superior to the deal Britain enjoys as a member of the Brussels club. Government analysis published on Wednesday anticipates slower economic growth under every Brexit scenario. Leaving with no deal would lead to a GDP shortfall of 7.7% by 2036; a managed hard Brexit – trading on the Canadian model – would incur an equivalent 4.9% penalty. A softer Brexit would shave 1.4% from growth over the same period. There are no numbers to match Theresa May’s deal, which is an expression of its vagueness regarding the long-term EU relationship.
Philip Hammond can only defend the prime minister’s approach as damage limitation, with compensating political benefits unrelated to economics. The chancellor’s candour is not helpful to Mrs May but he cannot pretend that Brexit makes financial sense. His emphasis on non-economic factors gets to the nub of the debate that Britain should be having now. Mr Hammond’s comments highlight the only feasible recommendation for Mrs May’s plan: it honours the referendum result. Especially vital from Downing Street’s perspective, the deal includes drastic immigration controls, which the prime minister sees as the most urgent demand of leavers.
Treasury modelling makes it clear that immigration has been good for the economy and so choking off labour mobility has a cost. That judgment gratifies MPs urging a much softer Brexit and campaigners demanding a second referendum, but it does not strengthen their political position as much as they might like. An uncomfortable fact of the pro-European experience to date is the weakness of arguments based on abstract GDP numbers. Many leave voters were sceptical of expert analysis and the absence of a crash straight after the vote reinforces the view that remainer doomsaying can be discounted. Other leavers accept that there will be pain but imagine it to be brief and mostly felt elsewhere, by other people.
A poignant part of the Treasury analysis is the observation of differential regional impacts. London, a remain stronghold, is relatively insulated from harm. The north-east of England and the West Midlands, with higher concentrations of leave voters, look most vulnerable. That disparity represents an opportunity and a challenge to pro-Europeans. They can reasonably point out that Brexit was mis-sold and that calling it off would serve those who voted for it more than those who didn’t. But that message carries a risk: many people who backed Brexit envisaging radical change would be insulted by the claim that their grievances can only be satisfied by refusing to do the thing they had so recently voted for.
In that sense, the chancellor’s joyless defence of the prime minister’s unloved deal illuminates a fundamental truth about the situation. The choice is not between good and bad Brexits but between different types of trauma. Leaving the EU is a painful procedure to which the only real upside is satisfaction of the powerful political demand that it be done. Whether meeting that test is reason enough to inflict the cost of leaving the EU is the real dilemma many MPs are weighing up but dare not express aloud.
• This article was amended on 29 November 2018 because an earlier version referred to claims that “leaving the UK could be painless”. That meant to say leaving the EU. This has been corrected.
