America’s aid iceberg

Global government-aid statistics underplay the less-heralded generosity of US citizens, writes Salil Tripathi.
  
  


In the early days after the tsunami ravaged large parts of Asia, Jan Egeland, who coordinated humanitarian relief efforts at the UN, termed western response to the crisis "stingy".

While the Norwegian official did not single out the US, the implication was clear. George Bush protested immediately; he asserted, with wounded pride, that Americans were generous.

They were indeed: according to the Chronicle of Philanthropy, within 10 days of the tsunami, private American aid exceeded $324m (£181.6m) towards tsunami relief. Official statistics did not then, nor now, capture such data.

Measuring disaggregated private data is difficult, but the resistance to do so is often ideological.

Since 1970, when a UN general assembly resolution called upon rich countries to increase their overseas development assistance to 0.7% of their gross national product, only five of the 22 countries (Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands), which form the development assistance committee (DAC) at the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have met and exceeded the target.

At the other extreme, six countries, including the US, have not set any time-table to meet that goal. At 0.16% of its GNP, the USStates ranks 21st out of the DAC 22. Only Italy ranks lower.

This has irritated many development agencies and NGOs. The economist Jeffrey Sachs, who published the astutely timed book, The End of Poverty, last year around the Gleneagles summit, has repeatedly asked Bush to open his heart and his chequebook.

As the world's finance ministers meet in Washington for the spring meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund this Friday, expect more pious calls directed at the US to contribute more generously.

But the figures on which these calls are made are deceptive. First, even at 0.16% of its GNP, the US still dwarfs all other donors globally in absolute terms. In 2004, at $19.7bn, it accounted for nearly a quarter of the total foreign aid of the OECD-DAC, of $79.51bn. Japan, at $8.91bn, was a distant second.

That's not good enough, critics say. The US aid budget may be significantly bigger than the Scandinavians', but it is a much bigger economy. If it matches Scandinavian proportions, the global pool of development funds would multiply. And poverty will be history, they reckon.

That's naïve because it presumes that the only way to end poverty is by increasing aid; and that increased aid will end poverty. Neither assumption is true.

Meanwhile, Americans are doing their bit. Consider the Index of Global Philanthropy. Released at the UN today (April 19) by the Hudson Institute, the index backs up American assertions: that aid statistics severely understate American generosity. When you add private aid flows, US overseas assistance rises by $71bn.

The index questions the 0.7% standard and calls it "misleading because it ignores enormous amounts as well as the effects of private aid."

There is undeniably a cultural difference here. The transatlantic divide in attitude, between state and private, is deep and philosophical, and its implications vary.

Private aid has often been more efficient, better targeted, and it can deliver superior results than state aid programmes have, as the performance of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in combating the global health crisis has shown. Private donors expect greater accountability from recipients than state donors do.

"For too long, commitment to the poor abroad has been measured by how much is spent, rather than how well," Carol Adelman, director of Hudson's Centre for Global Prosperity wrote last year.

"Private giving is usually faster, more nimble, more direct and accountable.... It can better avoid interference by corrupt officials in countries afflicted by natural disasters," she added.

The cultural issue is significant. Voluntarism and philanthropic spirit pervade many sectors of American society, running as deep as the distrust many Americans have for big government. The tax code also helps. Being lightly taxed, giving is easier for Americans, compared to their European counterparts, who appear to have a greater appetite for paying taxes and then expecting the state to be generous on their behalf.

In an editorial, the Washington Post agreed that the Hudson Institute was right in noting the reach of private US philanthropy, but it pointed out that migrant workers' remittances formed nearly half of all US philanthropy, official assistance included.

That raises a fundamental question: the role of remittances in development. In 2004, global remittance flows to poor countries were twice the size of official aid. This has several implications. In two thought-provoking papers last year, Raghuram Rajan, director of research at the IMF, and his colleagues, challenged the perception that more aid for poor countries is better.

There is no conditional link between aid and growth, he argued, and without growth, the country will not emerge out of its culture of dependency. Other studies have shown that remittances create physical assets (such as building a house for the family, capital investment or recruitment of labour in a family farm, or investment in a small business), whereas official aid often disappears in the general budget, assuming it does not get siphoned off.

But critics have complained that remittances are directed at families or hometowns, and such assistance leads to lopsided growth in countries overwhelmingly dependent on remittances, such as the Philippines or Mexico.

Remittance-dependent regions, such as Chavakkad in India, do well; other parts suffer. Uneven growth can widen regional inequality, which has political repercussions. Social cohesion may suffer. The state may feel disempowered, as it loses control over setting development or investment priorities.

These critics miss a larger point. Their underlying assumption is that the state is a benign entity pursuing the best interests of its people. Sadly, in many poor nations, the state has been the problem.

Is it a coincidence that the countries with the lowest per capita income, that rank at the bottom of the UNDP's human development index, are also more likely to have poor governance, transparency, press freedom, and human rights protection?

The Hudson Index is right in reminding us that Americans are generous. It also has an important lesson for Europe: that the state need not be the only means through which aid should be channeled.

But as the record worldwide shows, private initiatives by themselves cannot single-handedly change the world either. Dogmatic, ideologically-driven insistence on state-led aid and development efforts is counterproductive, but unguided private aid is not the panacea either.

· Salil Tripathi is a former economics correspondent at the Far Eastern Economic Review.

 

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