Times change. When Giscard d'Estaing organised the first meeting of the Group of Six (as it then was) at Rambouillet outside Paris in 1975, it's unlikely that Africa or climate change were mentioned once. The west was too preoccupied with its own problems following the five-fold increase in the price of oil in late 1973 and early 1974.
Thirty years on, it's groundhog day. The price of oil is again soaring and the Middle East is in turmoil. Over the past few years, central banks have provided plenty of cheap money in an attempt to maintain decent levels of growth, just as they did in the mid-1970s. Yet, the fact that the G8 will spend two days putting together the latest rescue plan for Africa and having a dialogue of the deaf over global warming is evidence that the leaders are quite relaxed about the state of the world economy.
In the odd quiet moment, there may be a mention of crude at $60 a barrel and George Bush may seize the chance to press the Chinese for a currency revaluation, but that will be it. Tony Blair will have enough on his plate to worry too much about the storm clouds gathering above the UK economy, what with the development charities on his back over global poverty and the Americans and the Europeans at each others' throats over greenhouse gases.
As it happens, the G8 has some cause to be insouciant about the state of their economies. The US is steaming along with a growth rate of about 4%, Japan has at last shown signs of emerging from its 15-year deflationary trauma and even the laggardly Europeans could argue that they are over the worst. Globally, corporate profitability is strong. The historically low level of bond yields suggest that the financial markets agree with Alan Greenspan when he says that the long-term inflation outlook - notwithstanding what's happening to oil prices - looks benign. With China still pounding away, global growth looks set to follow last year's 5% expansion with about 4% this year. The model of the past few years has continued: China and other low-cost Asian countries supply the US with goods and then lend America the money to pay for them. This arrangement seems to suit all parties; the Chinese can keep their economy cranked up to full volume and the US can continue to live beyond its means. With both China and the US growing strongly, there is a ready market for Japanese and European exports.
There are five reasons why the G8 should be concerned about the sustainability of this model. The first is the soaring price of oil. Each time the oil price has risen in the past 30 years, the global economy has suffered a recession. The second is that the Federal Reserve is clearly intent on pushing up interest rates until the American consumer starts to rein in spending. Greenspan clearly believes that a US current account deficit of 5%-6% of GDP is unsustainable, and he's right.
The problem is that if the US consumer stops spending, there's not an awful lot for the global economy to fall back on. As Brian Reading says in his latest bulletin for Lombard Street Research: "Ignoring Anglo-Saxon bit parts, Americans are the only people willing to borrow and spend." But, the counterpart to this is that if, for any reason, Americans stop borrowing and spending, that will bring China's boom to a crashing halt and have knock-on effects in Europe and the rest of Asia.
As such, the third reason to be worried is that global growth is now reliant on the persistence of the imbalances that have left America with a whopping current account deficit and Asian countries with hefty surpluses. For every $100 earned by individuals in the US, they are spending $108 - not exactly a recipe for long-term sustainability.
The fourth concern is that recent movements in exchange rates are making the problem of the imbalances worse rather than better. Although a devaluation of the dollar is not a panacea for reducing the current account deficit to less scary proportions, the rise in the greenback's trade-weighted index since the spring is certainly not what the doctor ordered. It's not that hard to see why the dollar has been appreciating. Interest rates in the US are rising, whereas everywhere else they are being held steady or are about to come down. US growth is faster than Europe, where the shock from the no votes in the French and Dutch referendums has had an impact on sentiment towards the euro. But a higher dollar makes imports into the US cheaper and exports dearer. Little wonder, then, that the White House has been relentless in demands for the Chinese to drop their currency peg with the dollar. This demand, however, will continue to fall on deaf ears.
Finally, there's the question of what happens to all the liquidity that has been pumped into the system since 2001, when central banks decided that the aftermath of the dotcom crash and the blow to confidence from the 9/11 terrorist attacks required some seriously cheap money.
Some of the dirt-cheap dosh has helped pump up asset-price booms - in the housing markets of the US and UK, and in bond prices the world over. This, in itself, suggests that the recovery has been built on somewhat shaky foundations. A more interesting question going forward is whether the ease of obtaining credit will lead to the classic consequence of too much money chasing too few goods - higher inflation. There may be a time when even China cannot keep supply in line with demand.
For the time being, though, the G8 will assume that it is business as usual. After all, the Cassandras have been wrong with their forecasts of imminent disaster plenty of times in the past.
Despite everything, the global economy continues to function. What's more, there's a case for saying that even in the unlikely event that the G8 concluded this week that there was trouble ahead, there's not an awful lot they could do about it because the die is already cast. For all the mutual back-slapping about their masterly conduct of economic policy, serious mistakes have been made.
In the US, Greenspan's excessively low interest rates merely shifted the locus of the bubble economy from equities to housing. In Europe, the constipated nature of macro-economic management has left the single-currency zone teetering on the brink of a classic Keynesian liquidity trap, where at a time of low inflation monetary policy ceases to be an effective tool for boosting growth. The markets expect the European Central Bank to cut interest rates between now and the end of the year, but there is scant optimism that it will do much to raise domestic demand. And with budget deficits high in Germany, France and Italy, there's not a lot of scope for using fiscal policy either. Instead, Europe must hope that external demand from China and America remains strong, with the buoyancy of exports gradually seeping down into the domestic economy.
Finally, there's China. Here, there is something the G8 could usefully do, which is to recognise that if Moscow has a place at the top table then so should Beijing. Other than that, China's sky-high growth rate cloaks a multiplicity of weaknesses - its reliance on the US consumer, the misallocation of resources in its investment boom, the inefficiency of large chunks of its economy, the bottlenecks especially in energy and construction that put limits on growth, and the rampant financial speculation made possible by the recycling of all the US assets that have been bought as a consequence of the country's bilateral trade surplus.
Something has to give, and that goes not just for China but the entire G8. With luck, it won't all give at the same time.